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CONSCIOUSNESS DEMYSTIFIED: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE OF
DENNETT'S PROJECT
"Nonsense. Nonsense,--because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If
your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most
important facts . . . "
Wittgenstein, Zettel, 220
1. Introduction
Professor Dennett has recently embarked on what he considers a"de-mystifying philosophical
investigation"[ 1] with respect to the phenomena of consciousness. In essence the strategy he
has employed is one of getting us to "trade in" our ordinary intuitions so as to soften us up for the
first phases of a full-fledged "scientific" explanation of consciousness in terms of sub-personal
systems and their ontogenetic origins. His hope is that, once we are freed from certain
misleading metaphors about the mind we will be receptive to such an "explanation."
In concentrating on this first stage of his treatment of conscious phenomena I would like to offer
a critique of Dennett's project from a Wittgensteinian perspective. For Wittgenstein was also
concerned to "demystify" consciousness but his approach differed remarkably from Dennett's.
And this is ironic because in challenging our "everyday" intuitions about consciousness the latter
essentially regards himself as working within a Wittgensteinian framework. For example, he tells
us that "My debt to Wittgenstein is large and long-standing"[ 2] and he confesses that "what I am
doing [is] a kind of redoing of Wittgenstein's attack on the 'objects' of conscious experience."[ 3]
I wish here to challenge the idea that the "reductive character" of Dennett's project is in any way
Wittgensteinian in spirit. I want to suggest that at a crucial point in their philosophy their views
diverge significantly. That is to say, although they are good travelling companions up to an
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important cross-roads, in the end, their incompatible concerns take them in different directions.
Furthermore, by reviewing Dennett's project of "explaining" consciousness, we might begin to
see some good reasons for preferring Wittgenstein's "road less travelled." Thus, although
Dennett's account of consciousness is often given centre stage in what follows, my ultimate aim
is to throw light on the nature of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology by using Dennett as a
foil. This should help us to see precisely how the former's approach differs importantly from
those advanced by many of today's philosophers and cognitive scientists.
2. Stuff and Nonsense
When it comes to characterising the reality of psychological phenomena many of today's
philosophers in the post-Cartesian analytic tradition see themselves as faced with a choice:
either to advocate some form of dualism or some form of materialism.
The dualists tend to divide into two main camps, those who support substance dualism and
those who support property dualism. Substance dualists take minds to be logically distinct
entities which are strongly independent of bodies. Standardly such dualists argue that minds
must differ from physical substances because they "stand beneath" entirely different types of
attributes or properties--i.e., mental attributes or properties. According to this picture other bodily
organs are used as a model for "minds"--the main difference being that ordinary bodily organs,
such as hearts and livers, are located spatially in the world while minds are not. Furthermore, if
one thinks of the mind as some sort of non-physical entity or substance, then it is a natural next
step to think of "beliefs," "feelings," "moods" and their kin as objects, processes or states that
inhabit the mental domain. Nevertheless, one could separate these two ideas and allow that
although non-reducible "mental" phenomena exist "minds," conceived as separate entities, do
not. Those who take such a stand generally support a kind of "property dualism." Such a position
is reasonably popular even today.
Strangely enough, treating the "mind" as a home for "mental episodes" is not logically tied to
dualism. That is to say this "picture" of the mind as an extra non-bodily organ can get mixed up,
in a most unhelpful way, with a crude materialism. This happens when one simply relocates the
mind in the brain and treats mental phenomena as identical types or token brain events. Such
mind/brain events are then placed in a "physical" chain of causes. They are designated both as
the end result of incoming brain process and as the starting point for outgoing brain processes.
Appropriately, given the foundations of the modem debate, such a view has been dubbed
"Cartesian Materialism."
Asserting mental/physical identity is, of course, the natural response or reaction to dualism in its
various forms--but it is little more than that. This simple "re-fitting" makes these materialists
prone to misrepresent the nature of psychological phenomena in a new, perhaps more insidious,
way. The mental objects, states, processes, events, and so on, which, in accord with dualism,
would have inhabited the mind, have now simply become allegedly "unmysterious" brain states,
processes, activities, and events. Nevertheless, all their interesting mental properties are
somehow supposed to survive the transition.
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What is interesting is that neither dualism nor materialism, as sketched above, tell us anything of
much interest about the nature of mental phenomena. In fact the debate over their physicality
can obscure many important questions about their character. One of the initial problems in
getting clear about the nature of mental phenomena is that we find it hard to free ourselves of
Cartesian-style thinking on these matters. For what thwarts both the materialist and the dualist
when it comes to understanding the ontological commitments of commonsense psychology is
that they "accept a certain vocabulary and with it a set of assumptions."[ 4] The main assumption
being that it is justified to debate the ontology of "mental" objects and processes without first
saying what their nature is.
Wittgenstein and Dennett are united in their rejection of such talk. For example, one of the
primary stated aims of Consciousness Explained is to undermine the Cartesian legacy in the
philosophy of mind. Dennett believes that most philosophers, and those lay folk influenced by
them, conjure up images of an Inner (mental) Theatre complete with a Self who examines
various Objects of Consciousness (pains, colours, figments of the imagination, etc.) whenever
they think of the mind. They still think of our verbal reports concerning consciousness as based
upon what the Self sees "up on the screen." Apparently it "introspects" mental items in a way
similar to that in which we ordinarily inspect everyday things such as watches or pieces of china.
Dennett hopes to undermine this Cartesian model of the mind. To this end throughout the
chapters of Consciousness Explained he catalogues the kinds of traditional problems that such a
view engenders. Such problems include the interaction problem,[ 5] the problem of inverted
spectra,[ 6] and problems concerning epiphenomenal "qualia."[ 7] However, he gives us an
insight into his overarching reason for resisting the view by telling us that the "fundamentally antiscientific stance of dualism is, to my mind, its most disqualifying feature."[ 8]
Wittgenstein is also particularly interested in the idea of the Inner (or "states of consciousness"
as he refers to them in the preface of the Investigations). Nevertheless, for him, the source of our
misunderstanding about the nature of the Inner is not traced back to Descartes' doorstep--rather
it is generated by a primitive view of the operation of psychological language. For him the desire
to reify the "psychological" is bound up with the view that all language is essentially referential in
nature. It is linked with the idea that the primary function of words is to provide names for
objects. It is also bound up with the notion that the essential aim of language is to effect a simple
form of communication. The idea that when I tell you what is "going on inside me" I use words
like "sharp pain" to pass on information to you. If you are acquainted with "sharp pains" yourself,
if you know what kind of things those words designate, then by analogy you gain an insight into
my situation. For Wittgenstein, this picture of how language operates generates (and supports)
the idea of an "inner realm of mental events" which looks non-trivially like the "mental realm"
conjured up by Descartes' philosophy of mind.
It is the name-object view of language and its attendant metaphysics that Wittgenstein
challenges with his celebrated "private language argument." That argument is meant to show
that the meaning of our sensation-terms cannot be based on any appeal to inner entities.
Although it is much debated how to correctly interpret the Investigations' passages from 243 to
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275 which make up the "private language argument," I am inclined to side with those who take
Wittgenstein to be attacking the idea of the name-private-object view of psychological language
on the grounds that it is both superfluous and incoherent. I believe his essential criticism is that
an individual trying to employ such a language must presuppose that the "signs" they are using
are meaningful before they engage in the naming ceremony of private ostension which is
supposed to give them their meanings. The primary problem is that in order to group sensations
under a type one must already have in hand some independent standard with which to identify
and classify them. Thus, it isn't possible to use the "object" itself to provide such a standard. And,
in the absence of such a standard there can be no talk of being mistaken about whether or not a
"sign" hits its target and this is what robs the putative sensation "label" of any possible meaning.
What is important, for the terms of our discussion, is that because he attacks the name-object
view of language Wittgenstein is led to abandon the "picture" of inner mental processes. He feels
that the name-object view of psychological language is not only ill-founded, it is what prevents us
from seeing our psychological situation aright. As he writes:
The main difficulty arises from our imagining the experience (pain for instance) as a thing for
which of course we have a name and whose concept is therefore quite easy to grasp.[ 9]
The 'inner' is a delusion. That is: the whole complex of ideas alluded to by this word is like a
painted curtain drawn in front of the scene of the actual word use. [ 10]
Wittgenstein wants us to get past this picture and to attend to our actual use of psychological
"concepts." That is to say, he wants us to notice how, when and in what circumstances we
actually make psychological ascriptions to others or give expression to our own psychological
situation. It is precisely this attitude which underwrites the following series of remarks which are
typical of the later writings:
The expression "Who knows what is going on inside him!" The interpretation of outer events as
the consequences of unknown ones, of merely surmised, inner ones. The interest that is focused
on the inner, as if on the chemical structure, from which behaviour arises.
For one needs only to ask, "What do I care about inner events, whatever they are?!", to see that
a different attitude is conceivable.--"But surely everyone will always be interested in his inner
life!" Nonsense. Would I know that pain, etc., etc. was something inner if I weren't told so?[ 11]
And in the remark which follows shortly after those above we can see the beginnings of his
positive account about how we do, in fact, actually speak about the "inner" lives of others:
If we're asked "What's going on inside him?" we say "Surely very little goes on inside him." But
what do we know about it?! We construct a picture of it [the inner] according to his behaviour, his
utterances, his ability to think.[ 12]
We can see from this that Dennett and Wittgenstein are allied in their attack on the tendency to
reify "conscious states" (where this acts as an umbrella term for any number of mental
phenomena such as feeling pain, seeing colours, experiencing dizziness, etc.). Thus, even
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though they attack the idea of a reified mind from different directions and with different agendas,
they both object to the tendency to objectify experiences. As they see it the first things we must
do if we wish to avoid becoming bogged down in the kind of interminable metaphysical
squabbles that sponsor the traditional dualism/materialism debate is to recognise that the term
mind does not refer to a kind of entity at all and to realise that conscious states are not special
kinds of "object"--not even strange sorts of object whose essi really is percepi.
It may also appear, at first glance, that despite the difference in the origins of their worries
concerning reified mental phenomena Dennett and Wittgenstein advance somewhat similar
positive accounts. More specifically, we might say the "behaviourist" aspect of Dennett's
"personal" level understanding of consciousness has Wittgensteinian roots. For example, in one
way or another, they both agree that concentration on outward behaviour and linguistic
"expressions" provides a better way for us to understand the nature of consciousness. My
ultimate aim in this paper is to reveal that this apparent similarity is, in fact, an illusion. In what
follows I will describe in some detail the road Dennett takes before comparing it to that of
Wittgenstein in section four.
3. Dennett's New State of Consciousness
In place of the Cartesian Theatre metaphor Dennett proposes what he calls the Multiple Drafts
model of consciousness. He claims that "heterophenomenology" will serve as the best means of
neutrally analysing the conscious reports of ourselves and others. While engaged in
heterophenomenology we effectively allow the subject to verbally "describe for us the nature of
his or her conscious experiences." in reality, however, we let the subject generate a text about a
"notional" world and, on the whole, we give them authority concerning the nature of that world
and what is found in it. Such notional worlds are analogous to fictional worlds, such as Sherlock
Holmes's London (not the real London).[ 13] in being of a like nature to such fictional worlds,
"The subject's heterophenomenological world will be a stable inter subjectively confirmable
theoretical posit, having the same metaphysical status as, say, Sherlock Holmes's London or the
world according to Garp.[ 14]
The "texts" which are generated in these circumstances (and not something above and beyond
which they refer to) effectively constitute consciousness. We need take the conscious
experiences described in them no more seriously at the level of ontology than we would
Professor Moriarty or the hound of the Baskervilles. To put it crudely, according to this view,
conscious experience is treated as nothing over and above the very "reports" we give,
"judgements" we make, and "beliefs" we hold about our putative experiences. Thus,
consciousness is reduced to the "intentional" in this fashion.
Nor is Dennett satisfied with this reduction alone. He feels that we cannot fully "explain"
consciousness unless we get beneath it somehow. We won't have explained it until we give a
naturalistic explanation of our ability to make "speech acts" which purportedly act as expressions
of our conscious experience. For, he believes that "Only a theory that explained conscious
events in terms of unconscious events could explain consciousness at all."[ 15] His hope is
therefore to explain how it is that our "talk about consciousness" is produced by underlying sub-
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systems and to give an on-togenetic explanation of how those sub-systems were formed. That is
to say, after having argued that the episodes of consciousness are nothing but the content of
coherently generated heterophenomenological texts Dennett's next move is to try to explain our
ability to generate such texts from within a naturalistic framework. The essence of his
explanatory account is described in this quotation; "I am suggesting conscious human minds are
more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented--inefficiently----on the parallel hardware
evolution has provided for us."[ 16] The virtual machine that gives rise to consciousness he calls
a Joycean Machine. That is, one which is able to generate detailed texts concerning "streams of
consciousness" after the fashion of James Joyce's production of Ulysses.
This view has an important consequence. That is to say, since Dennett does not believe the
Joycean software (i.e., that which turns us into conscious beings) is built-in, he is prepared to
argue that Joycean machines are the result of cultural design. Hence, we get the result that
consciousness is" . . . largely a product of cultural evolution that gets imparted to brains in early
training . . ."[ 17] At one point he even makes this intrepid remark: "If consciousness is
something over and above the Joycean machine, I have not yet provided a theory of
consciousness at all."[ 18]
This aspect of Dennett's account has been a major source of disillusionment for his readers--for
as they see it such an admission amounts to a complete rejection of the idea that conscious
states have any "qualitative" content--a denial that there is anything that it is "like" to experience
certain forms of consciousness. Their complaint is usually made by pointing to the fact that nonhuman animals and infants surely have conscious awareness even though they lack the ability to
produce texts of a Joycean standard.[ 19]
The way Dennett jumps in response to this sort of criticism is instructive. In places he seems to
concede the possibility that consciousness might obtain even without a full-fledged Joycean text
based on our linguistically mediated capacity for "reportage." That is to say he allows that
"Heterophenomenology without a text is not impossible, just difficult."[ 20] For example, he says
of imagining what it is like to be a bat, the "task would require us to subject ourselves to vast
transformations . . . [but] we could use our research to say what these transformations would
be."[ 21] In this case our biological and ecological research would help by showing "us a great
deal of what a bat could and could not be conscious of under various conditions."[ 22] That is,
through empirical and controlled testing ecologists may be able to tell me that bats can only be
aware of moths (or what not) at X distance. And, naturally, such information will be of help to me
in the course of devising a "notional world" for the bat.
At other times he responds by arguing that our "folksy" intuitions regarding animal and infant
consciousness are not sacrosanct.[ 23] Thus, when Fellows and O'Hear point out that: "an
immediate reaction to the virtual software aspect of the multiple drafts model might be to say
animals and human infants seem to be conscious perfectly well without the mediation of any
culturally acquired 'software' . . .,"[ 24] Dennett has the ready reply: "I agree; they seem to be.
But are they? And what does it mean to say that they are or they aren't? . . . I claim that this
question has no clear pre-theoretical meaning."[ 25] This is the crux of the matter: Dennett
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doesn't feel we can make any "pre-theoretical" sense of our shared intuitions about the general
quality of conscious experience (nonverbal or otherwise).
The common thread to both responses is that we must not surrender, at any cost, the
streamlined and principled criterion for consciousness which is provided by
heterophenomenology. For a return to our rag-tag intuitions on this score could potentially lead
to the admission of all kinds of nonsense and a revitalisation of the perplexing paradoxes of
consciousness. But the price we must pay for having this "neat" criterion is that we must jettison
some of our most deeply held intuitions concerning consciousness.
One might expect that in doing away with the very idea of "objects" of consciousness
Wittgenstein must be advancing a revisionist line as well. But importantly he does not. On the
contrary he is concerned to "leave everything as it is." In the next section I want to explain how
he does this and to show how this makes his views on the philosophy of psychology more
plausible than Dennett's.
4. Expressing Wittgenstein's Position
I have claimed that Wittgenstein offers an understanding of consciousness that differs
significantly from that of his self-styled "follower" Dennett. I maintain that the key difference
between these two thinkers revolves around their attitudes towards the behaviour and speech
acts which are regarded as deliverances concerning "consciousness." Wittgen-stein is
concerned to understand those deliverances as expressive in character while Dennett, on the
other hand, hardly gives them any attention at all in his eagerness to engage in his larger project
of "explaining" consciousness.
I said at the outset that I wanted to use Dennett's account to help throw light on Wittgenstein's
position--to show in what ways the latter's position was superior. I hope to achieve this by
revealing the naivete inherent in Dennett's attitude toward the nature of psychological language.
It is his lack of attention to the issue of how we interpret speech acts that makes his treatment of
consciousness thoroughly inadequate. It is because he lacks any positive account of how such
language operates that, unlike Wittgenstein, he has trouble making room for the "inner" after
having evacuated the Cartesian Theatre. Let me make my complaint more specific.
Despite having partially seen that it is a serviceable objection to Cartesianism to show that there
are no mental items which are "designated" by our talk of conscious experience, his very
description of the heterophenomenological method nevertheless encourages the view that
language, when it is performing its true office, is essentially referential in character. That is to
say, he feels no discomfort in treating the deliverances concerning consciousness as referring to
objects in the subject's notional world. The idea, as I understand it, looks something like this: we
can make space for conscious entities so long as we don't take them too seriously at the level of
ontology. This is why his account of consciousness is truly deflationary. Dennett's "irrealism"
about consciousness is non-accidentally linked with the fact that he still treats talk of conscious
experiences as "kinds of report" whereas Wittgenstein does not. My objection to Dennett is that
one will only feel the pressure to treat conscious deliverances less than seriously if one thinks

EBSCOhost

Page 8 of 13

that the purpose of language is simply to "name"--hence having failed to name a "real" thing we
should think of this talk as naming "notional" things.
What is worse, despite his appeal to "notional worlds," Dennett still owes his reader an account
of how we are able to interpret the content of "reports" that others make and the content of the
beliefs they hold. And even he realises that the heterophenomenological "process depends on
assumptions about which language is being spoken, and some of the speaker's intentions."[ 26]
But he gives no explanation as to how we are able to interpret these quasi-'reports' of others. For
example, in collaborating to create your heterophenomenological world I hear you say "I see a
purple cow." But what is it that I take you to be saying? How am I to understand the meaning of
that report if it is referring to some item in your notional world? What is it about my knowledge of
English that enables me to know what you mean? It cannot be that I understand you because I
know what kind of notional objects your words designate. For, to put the point succinctly, the
private-language argument will work just as effectively against objects in a notional world as in a
private inner world. Beetles in boxes are beetles in boxes, whether they are real or notional.
Having seen the folly of thinking that you are referring to a private object of experience when
making an utterance about your state of mind, Dennett does not go on to provide any plausible
positive account as to how we might make sense of such utterances even though "typically, he
has subjects being conscious only of the content of their mental states."[ 27] But if this is the
case why doesn't Dennett give more attention to the content of the "seeming" reports about
conscious seemings? He doesn't even begin seriously to address such questions other than to
appeal to the fact that for most conscious beings who speak the same language it will be
unproblematic to determine what they mean. I believe he is faced with this problem because,
despite his reduction of consciousness to the intentional, Dennett is also deeply suspicious of
"meaning" and follows a Quinean eliminativist line in treating "meaning" as non-objective and
hence of second-rate importance.
I believe that it is Dennett's complete lack of concern for the workings of psychological language
that crucially divorces his project from its Wittgensteinian origins. Furthermore, it is because he
rejects the idea of the "reified mind" for very different reasons than Wittgenstein that he feels no
pressure to address these sorts of issues.
Ironically, because he does not fully appreciate Wittgenstein's purposes Dennett accuses him of
lacking the courage of his conviction in this matter. For instance, while he approves of the
famous remark: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a
something; for the box might even be empty"--he accuses Wittgenstein of "Hedging his bets"
when he adds shortly afterward "Its not a something, but not a nothing either."[ 28] Dennett, on
the other hand, tells us that he is willing to take the bull by the horns and claims in doing so to be
more "radical" than Wittgenstein.[ 29] But this sort of talk only reveals how little Dennett really
understood Wittgenstein's positive views.
It is true that many have found the "not a something but not a nothing" remark to be deliberately
and unnecessarily cyptic. But I think Wittgenstein is simply being careful. What he is doing is
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partly re-stating his dismissal of the "reified mind"--i.e., repeating that he is not prepared to treat
consciousness as "thing-like"--while at the same time making it clear that he nevertheless
remains committed to taking our talk of consciousness seriously. We are not reporting to others
about objects in a real 'inner' worldnornon-objects in some notional world. What we are doing is
giving expression to our psychological situation. Unlike Dennett, at least Wittgenstein tells us a
story about how psychological language operates.
Wittgenstein is like Dennett in that he realises that once we give up on the myth of a "reified
mind" we cannot construe judgements about our psychological situation as being kinds of report.
We cannot treat them as being based on some kind of inner evidence because the very idea of
inner evidence is an oxymoron. That is to say, we are not making judgements about "inner
objects" when we give expression to our "inner" situation. And this also means we have no
evidence to back up statements about our inner life. And just as the idea of "inner" evidence is
nonsense it would be equally wrong to think that we rely on "outer" evidence in order to decide
how we feel. I do not decide that I am in pain by first noticing a cut on my leg, nor do I decide this
by noticing that I am having an "inner" sensation of pain by some process of introspection. I
simply feel pain and say so. Psychological language is expressive, not referential. This is why "a
lie about inner processes is of a different category from one about outer processes."[ 30]
My linguistic utterances of pain are natural extensions of, or replacements for, my earlier ways of
expressing pain--i.e., shouting, bawling, etc. A development of more primitive forms of response
that we share with animals. It is because psychological language is expressive that Johnson tells
us that the basis of our sophisticated kind of language game has more to do with sincerity than
accuracy.[ 31] Accuracy presupposes some independent means of verification and that is
precisely what we lack in this case. Hence, Wittgenstein encourages us to treat the speech acts
concerning our "inner life" as confessional in nature. He writes; "What is the importance of
someone making this or that confession? Does he have to be able to judge his condition
correctly?--What matters here is not an inner condition he judges, but just his confession."[ 32]
And note " . . . confession is of course something exterior."[ 33]
But we may wonder: how are we to understand "pretence" on a view that insists that 'nothing is
hidden' and that psychological language is essentially expressive? For of course it is still
possible that a person could be lying with their confession. And what are they lying about? Here
Wittgenstein reminds us that: "Above all pretence has its own outward signs. How could we
otherwise talk about pretence at all?"[ 34] Moreover he makes it perfectly clear how we are to
treat such cases when he talks about the role trust plays in dealing with another's psychology.
He writes: "Do I pay any mind to his inner processes if I trust him? If I don't trust him I say, "!
don't know what's going on inside him." But if I trust him, I don't say I know what's going on
inside him."[ 35] That is to say, if I do trust him I treat his utterances as being genuinely
expressive--just as in a more primitive setting his facial or other bodily expressions would be
transparent to me. If there is an asymmetry between these cases it is just the opposite of what
one would expect if we thought there were objects of consciousness. In the case where there is
pain we can get by with just the "expression," in the case of pretence, where there is no pain, we
must treat the utterance as serving a different and potentially deceptive function. The point is that
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we need not return to the idea of a reified mind in order to make logical space for the possibility
of "pretence."
Is this, in effect, a reduction of the inner to outer behaviour? Wittgen-stein constantly rejects this
interpretation of his project. This occurs in many places in the later writings. I have collected but
a few to support my view that it is wrong to read him as sponsoring behaviourism in any form.
. . . the impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against
the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us
the correct idea of the use of [psychological] word[s] . . . [ 36]
"Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything
except human behaviour is a fiction?"--If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.
[ 37]
. . . we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet un-comprehended medium.
And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny
them?
But am I not really speaking only of the outer? . . . it is as if I wanted to explain (quasi-define) the
inner through the outer. And yet it isn't so.[ 39]
I believe it helps to see how unbehaviourist he really was when we contrast his position to that of
Dennett's. For in concentrating solely on the "grammar" of our mental discourse, by rejecting the
name-object picture of language as altogether inappropriate in this domain, Wittgen-stein is led
to a more satisfactory view of the nature and importance of consciousness. He has not tried to
equate "consciousness" with talk of the outer behaviour of bodies, rather he has reminded us
that in treating others as conscious we are always engaged in an interpretative project (broadly
conceived) informed by our form of life.
The important thing to notice is that talk of "our experiences" is not to be treated as analogous to
the language we use when talking about physical objects. Psychological talk has its own unique
grammar that must be attended to if we are to understand it. In other words the strength of
Wittgenstein's approach is that when he rejects the idea that reified conscious states have reality
rights he simultaneously attacks the name-object picture of language. Thus, as he has a
different, more sophisticated conception of how language operates, he is not even tempted to be
"irrealist" about consciousness. He writes: "The connection of inner and outer is part of these
concepts. We don't draw this connection in order to magically remove the inner. There are inner
concepts and outer concepts."[ 40] Thus, although Wittgenstein is often regarded as the grand
gum of "logical behaviourism" with respect to "the mental," it is in fact more appropriate that
Dennett should wear this title. For Witttgenstein the inner is not demystified through elimination.
It is demystified because in attending to the nature of psychological language our understanding
of "consciousness" is, to use Mulhall's words, "demythologized."
5. Conclusion

EBSCOhost

Page 11 of 13

What would Wittgenstein make of Dennett's "demystifying investigation"? I think he would regard
the latter's counter-intuitive "theory" as a bad response to a series of problems which rest on a
house of cards. In offering us such a "theory" Dennett is falling into the trap of trying to give "new
information" or a "new discovery" to solve a philosophical problem[ 41] when instead what is
needed is an investigation into the way psychological language operates.[ 42] Ironically, by
advancing his "metaphysically minimalist" account of consciousness which introduces us to such
things as "notional worlds" Dennett has simply generated a new sort of mythology of his own.
Rather than settling the issue with his "new set of metaphors" he simply creates different puzzles
to confuse the metaphysician.
Wittgenstein's attitude, on the other hand, is that philosophy finds peace when it understands the
nature of the problems that concern it (and bedevil it). Thus, in taking the road he does, in the
end we must regard Dennett as being mistaken in believing that he is, in fact, "more
Wittgensteinian than St. Ludwig himself."[ 43] It is not that Dennett has been more thorough in
his application of Wittgenstein's principles, rather it is that he has thoroughly misunderstood
those principles. We must correctly describe our psychology by attending to our ordinary
psychological talk. We will not escape our philosophical problems by supplanting such talk (or
surpassing it) by advancing a superior theory. This reveals the crucial difference in the character
of their "demystifying" investigations. To successfully demystify consciousness Dennett thinks
we need to develop a principled, and revisionist, theory of consciousness--but, if Wittgenstein is
right what we require is a rearrangement of facts we have already always known. We need to get
a clear view of the nature of our psychological language.
"Consciousness Demytified: A Wittgenteinian Critique of Dennett's Project" by Daniel Hutto, The
Monist, vol. 78, no. 4, 464-479. Copuright (C) 1995, THE MONIST, La Salle, Illinois 61301.
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